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 ABSTRACT 
 This study looked into the process of a firm actively adapting to the 
environmental shift and generating good performances by acquiring 
relational capital as well as personal expertise through the board 
members. The effect of board composition on firm‘s performance was 
measured, specifically focusing on personnel with political 
background, accounting specialists, and foreign company related 
personnel. The results indicate that firms under extreme 
environmental change actively utilize their network of board of 
directors, and such efforts substantially affect firm performance. The 
implication of this study is in that it empirically verified the 
relationship between board composition and firm performance based 
on resource.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Previous studies on relationship between board composition and firm performance 
had largely been carried on through two perspectives (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). The 
first perspective viewed the relationship through the lens of  agency theory, asserting that 
the board of  directors positively affects firm performance; the board boosts performance 
through minimizing agency costs by monitoring the actions of  executive managers 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Daily and Dalton, 1994a, 
1994b; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Goodstein and Boeker, 1991; Lorsch and MacIvor, 1989; 
Mizruchi, 1983; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). Agency theory asserts that when the 
board of  directors is more independent from the firm‘s management, the monitoring 
function of  the board works better. A greater ratio of  outside directors in the board, 
therefore, can improve a firm‘s performance. And higher incentives for more intensive 
monitoring also can be expected to derive better performances.  
Second line of  research on the relationship of  board composition and firm 
performance had been based on the resource dependency theory; board of  directors not 
only serves as a monitoring body but also acts as a resource provider, increasing its 
importance in times when the firm lacks resources or when there is highly uncertainty in 
the external environment (Boyd, 1990; Daily and Dalton, 1994a, 1994b, Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). The resource dependency theory perspective 
asserts that resources provided by the board positively affects firm performance, and that 
firm performance would be greater when there is an environmental fit between the board-
provided resources and the external environment.  
Nevertheless, the existing researches cannot show the result which is consistent about 
relationship between board composition and performance. The study of  Dalton et al. 
(2003) conducting a meta-analysis of  relations between the board composition and 
performance also failed to figure out the effects the board has on firm performance. 
Furthermore, Zahra and Pearce (1989) observed that it is necessary to take into 
consideration functions the board can provide, in order to explain the effects of  the board 
of  directors on firm performance.  
This study focused on the fact that inconsistent results of  studies on relations 
between structure of  the board and performance lay on situational context. For the 
companies in emerging countries which do not clearly distinguish ownership and 
management or which face radical changes in the outside environment, the board‘s 
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function of  linking the company with the outside world or providing resources is more 
important than that of  supervising. This study intended to confirm that the structure of  
the board should be altered in accordance with environmental changes in order to 
properly connect the company with the outside. 
This study therefore focuses on studying the relationship between board composition 
and firm performance based on resource dependency theory perspective. Specifically we 
focus on board composition following radical external environment changes, along with 
the effects of  board‘s capabilities to establish environmental linkages between firm 
performance and survival. The object of  this analysis, board composition in Korean 
financial sector in the 10 year period from 1997 to 2006 was selected. Korea is an 
emerging country and at the same time Korean financial sector had undergone severe 
environmental shifts during this period, including a national financial crisis followed by big 
regulatory reforms. This time period would thus provide an ideal sample for empirically 
testing the relationship between board composition changes and firm performance.  
Also this study attempted to draw implications by confirming that to consider 
situational context and to organize the board accordingly are essential when organizing the 
board of  a company. This study would consequently extend existing literature by applying 
resource dependency theory in the context of  an emerging market and external 
environmental changes as the basis of  analysis.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
Theoretical background 
In the resource dependency theory perspective, board of  directors is a direct provider 
of  resources (Boyd, 1990; Daily and Dalton, 1994a, 1994b; Hillman, Cannella, and 
Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Lynall, Golden, and Hillman 
(2003) had integrated existing literature on board of  directors and categorized resources 
provided by the board of  directors into the following four types: first, advice and counsel 
on firm‘s actions; second, heightened legitimacy for the firm; third, channels for 
communicating information between the firm and external organization; and fourth, 
assistance in obtaining resources and commitment from important elements outside the 
firm (Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Numerous prior studies have reported that resources provided by board of  directors 
positively affect firm performance. Selznick (1949) had shown that the heightened 
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legitimacy provided by the board can improve focal firm‘s corporate image. The expertise 
of  the board (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990) and administering advice and counsel 
provided by the board (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989; Mintzberg, 1983) were also proven to 
be useful in improving firm performance. 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) further conceptualized such resources as ―Board Capital‖. 
Board Capital is a broad concept including both human resources provided directly by the 
board members and relational capital provided through utilizing their social networks. 
They also indicated that studies concerning board of  directors had mostly focused on 
human resources directly provided by board members, with only relatively few studies 
looking into relational capital. 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) defined relational capital as a sum of  resources either 
potentially existing in or obtainable through relational networks of  individuals and 
organizations. Few prior studies on relational capital had regarded relational capital as a 
link between board of  directors and the external environment. Board of  directors act as a 
buffer for the firm, absorbing and reducing shocks coming from uncertainties in the 
external environment. The link between the firm and external environment is determined 
according to the level and types of  focal firm‘s external dependency (Boyd, 1990; Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978).  
Prior studies have also found board composition to be closely related to the 
surrounding environment. The ratio of  attorneys in the board of  directors is associated 
with the strength of  regulations in the industry; the ratio of  board members from 
financial institutions increases when the financial requirements are high for the focal firm 
(Pfeffer, 1972). Hillman (2005) stated that the government is a key factor in determining a 
firm‘s external interdependency, causing firms to appoint ex-politicians as their board 
members to attenuate external interdependency caused by the government. Hillman also 
proved that this tendency becomes more significant in industries with stronger 
government regulations. 
However, even the above stated researches lack more detailed inquiries into the 
relationship between board composition change and firm performance following 
environmental shifts (Hillman, 2005). As firm‘s environment is greatly affected by 
institutional contexts, further researches with specific contexts in regard are required; In 
short, future researches should address the question regarding which types of  
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environmental shifts and corresponding linkages may be most effective in contexts of  
different countries. 
 
Korean economic crisis and environmental change in financial industry  
Korean economy, which had grown with tremendous speed in 1980s, began preparing 
for globalization of  financial market with step-by-step deregulation plans in the financial 
sector. The planning began with joining of  OECD (organization for economic 
cooperation and development) in 1996. Before these plans were carried out, however, 
Korean economy encountered a huge crisis. Incidents such as the crash of  Thailand‘s Baht 
in other Asian countries grew into full-fledged foreign currency crisis and its effect was 
stronger than anticipated. On top of  that, Korean companies that had focused on external 
growth through foreign currency loans, such as Hanbo and Kia, collapsed. Suddenly 
repayment of  national foreign debt became impossible. In December 1997, Korea finally 
resorted to calling IMF (International Monetary Fund) for a bailout program.  
As a return for financial aid, IMF program required Korean financial sector to be 
restructured according to more developed standards. Details of  restructuring included 
structural adjustments for underperforming financial firms, improvements on 
transparency and global competitiveness of  financial institutions, strengthening of  
accounting principles, meeting BIS(Bank for International Settlement) capital adequacy 
ratio levels, and opening financial market to the outside world (Keith, 1998). Table 1 
shows the demands of  IMF and the enforcement of  government. 
Such sudden and dynamic environmental shifts that come with the Korean economic 
crisis can be divided largely in the three categories. First of  all, Korean economic crisis 
caused a rapid carrying out of  various regulatory changes that had been postponed before 
the crisis. Financial industry was not only considered as an independent industry, but more 
so as a typical industry that is heavily regulated and is acting as a supporting function for 
other industry sectors. Although liberalization measures had been planned beforehand, 
they were not easily carried out due to environmental constraints. Korean economic crisis 
overruled all of  these constraints and rapidly pushed liberalization measures into actual 
enactments. 
Liberalization measures following Korean economic crisis started with the adoption 
of  automatic floating exchange rate regime and liberalization of  foreign currency in 
December 1997. In May 1998, stock market was fully opened to the world market by 
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removing stock investment limit for foreigners to better attract foreign capital. Criteria for 
establishment of  insurance and securities companies were alleviated in 2003, along with 
regulations for shops and asset management. Interest rate regulations for demand deposits 
were also removed in 2004 to complete the interest rate liberalization, and the operation 
of  financial institutions was extended to help build competitiveness and to provide more 
diversified services. 
 
Table 1: Demands by IMF and enforcement of  governments 
 
Secondly, the Korean economic crisis caused the government to strengthen prudential 
regulations; Prompt Corrective Action system was adopted and enforced across the entire 
financial industry, and Forward Looking Criteria (FLC) was reinforced. FLC for banks, 
merchant banks, and insurance companies were amended to include their future ability for 
debt payments in the criteria. Furthermore, evaluation methods for securities owned by 
financial institutions were changed to mark-to-market method in order to improve 
management transparency. Public announcement periods for accounting and management 
reports too were reduced to quarterly basis from the reporting system that had previously 
been operating on half-year basis for banks, merchant banks, and insurance companies. 
Thirdly, Korean economic crisis caused the Korean financial market to fully open its 
doors to the outside world, further leading to an increase in both the foreign investment 
on Korean securities and the Korean investment on foreign securities; in short, 
globalization of  the financial market was quickly showing a progress. Liberalization of  
Demands by IMF Enforcement of Governments Source 
Restructuring 
of  Banks 
-Capital reduction and privatization for Seoul First Bank 
-Improvements of management for 12 banks with BIS ratio 
below 8% 
-Cease of operations and revocation of licenses for incompetent 
financial firms 
 
Kim (2007) 
Lee et al. 
(2001) 
Min et al. 
(2007) 
Strengthening 
of  Financial 
Supervision 
-Establishments and revisions of financial reform laws (1997. 12) 
-Unification of financial supervisory system 
(1998. 4) 
 
Kim (2007) 
Lee et al. 
(2001) 
Strengthening 
of  Accounting 
Principles 
-Unrealized loss of  securities reflected 100% on the B/S (98. 8. 
15.) 
-Reserve for credit loss reflected 100% on the B/S (99. 1. 1.) 
 
Kim (2007) 
Min et al. 
(2007) 
Globalization 
of  Financial  
Industry 
-Admission for banks and security firms to set up local 
subsidiaries (98. 3. 31.) 
Kim (2007) 
Min et al. 
(2007) 
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capital–such as removing the limit of  foreign ownership of  stocks—had lifted the ratio of  
stocks owned by foreign investors from 18.5% in late 1999 to 40.1% in 2004. Foreign 
acquisition of  Korean financial institutions and direct investments also greatly increased in 
the process of  selling off  insolvent financial institutions. Market share of  these foreign-
owned banks have been continuously increasing, along with the investments on foreign 
securities by the Korean financial institutions. 
Such dynamic environmental shift had a tremendous effect on the management of  
the concerned institutions. Efforts to reduce uncertainties and external dependency 
caused by environmental shifts are still being made. 
 
Research hypotheses 
As aforementioned, this study will look into how board composition of  Korean 
financial institutions were changed to adapt to the environmental shifts in financial 
industry –easing of  regulation, strengthening of  accounting principles, and opening up to 
global market—and how the change affected performance. Hypotheses to be presented in 
this section are derived from contexts of  specific environmental shifts. 
Firms that create linkages with important sources of  external dependency can reduce 
uncertainty (Pfeffer, 1972). And these linkages buffer firms from environmental 
fluctuations (Thompson, 1967). The reduction in uncertainty provided by such linkages 
also lowers transaction costs inherent with external exchange (Williamson, 1984) and 
ultimately improves survival (Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986) and performance 
Policy, regulation, and enforcement of  the government are one of  the most critical 
factors of  a firm‘s external environment (Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999; Mahon 
and Murray, 1981; Marsh 1998; Shaffer, 1995). As for the Korean financial industry, this 
was truer because Korean financial institutions had traditionally functioned as a 
supporting organization for other business sectors, for which government regulations had 
left standing out in its effect. Hillman (2005) stated that there is a tendency to appoint ex-
politicians as members of  the board in highly regulated industry in order to reduce 
uncertainties caused by relatively high external interdependence to government. Hillman 
had found that the number of  ex-politicians in the board of  directors is meaningfully 
associated with firm performance in a highly regulated industry. 
Above argument could also be applied to the context of  Korean financial industry. In 
order to manage huge environmental shifts including Korean economic crisis, various 
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regulatory changes, and a full market opening, Korean financial institutions had to change. 
Efforts to recruit personnel with network ties to government were recognized to have 
positive effect on firm performance, by assisting in building a stronger relationship with 
the regulating body. This flow of  logic leads to the first hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firm performance is more positively associated with the number of  government related 
personnel in the board composition during the economic crisis than after the crisis.   
 
Another important environmental factor that had a substantial effect on financial 
institutions after the Korean economic crisis regards the strengthening of  accounting 
reporting standards. This was aimed to improve management transparency. Before the 
Korean economic crisis, securities owned by financial institutions were evaluated based on 
book value. But after crisis, this was changed to applying market-to-market rule for 
evaluation of  securities. Other standards such as reserve requirement ratio were also 
amended to follow BIS standards, which were widely accepted as a global standard. 
Accounting standards and the level of  supervision for Korean financial institutions had 
become much stricter following the crisis. 
As adopting global standard for accounting had become one of  the critical external 
factors of  survival—in the flurry of  M&A and organizational reform that followed the 
Korean economic crisis—the importance of  having accounting specialists in the board of  
directors increased. 
Professional expertise of  accounting specialists is the human capital the board can 
directly benefit from. On the other hand, such accounting specialists also could provide 
relational capital such as information, visibility, legitimacy, and signaling acquired through 
their networks in the accounting or inspection organizations. 
Compared to the composition of  board of  directors before the Korean economic 
crisis, increased ratio of  accounting specialists in the board of  directors can be expected 
to have a more powerful effect on the firm performance. The second hypothesis is that 
the increase in the ratio of  accounting specialist in the board after the crisis would have a 
positive effect on the performance of  financial institutions. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Firm performance is more positively associated with the number of  accounting 
specialists in the board composition during the economic crisis than after the crisis. 
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Third important factor in the external environmental shift after the crisis is 
globalization of  financial capital. Globalization of  an industry can take many forms. In the 
Korean financial sector, globalization primarily meant entrance of  global financial 
companies such as Goldman Sachs and Citi Bank into the Korean market. The 
competition between Korean banks and such global banks soon intensified. Introduction 
of  new financial products developed by financial engineering along with the competition 
on their rate of  return was also a field new to Korean banks. 
Globalization, in the form of  intensified competition, had increased external 
dependency of  Korean financial institutions on global firms. An effective countermeasure 
that could be taken by Korean firms to cope with negative external effects of  
globalization was creating more linkages with the global firms. These linkages, similar with 
having more accounting specialists in the board composition, would provide direct human 
capital along with information, visibility, legitimacy, and signaling as a relational capital. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Firm performance is more positively associated with the number of  directors with 
foreign company related personnel in the board composition during the economic crisis 
than after the crisis. 
 
DATA AND METHOD 
Sample  
The sample of  this study consists of  177 observations from 34 Korean banks in the 
10 year period between 1997 and 2006. 1997 is when the Korean economic crisis had 
struck Korea. Following the Korean economic crisis, Korean financial industry took a 
series of  actions to strengthen prudential regulations; Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) 
was adopted and Forward Looking Criteria (FLC) was reinforced. Globalization was also 
greatly accelerated. Moreover, the financial market fully opened, letting in foreign capital 
investments on the Korean securities and letting out Korean capital investments on 
foreign capital. Such settings provide an ample research opportunity for studying the 
effects of  board composition changes on firm performance. 
The 10 year period of  1997 to 2006 is when merger and acquisition between Korean 
financial institutions actively took place as a result of  Korean economic crisis. All of  the 
34 banks observed in this study are categorized into acquirer and acquired banks. 
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Additionally, the observations of  the acquirer banks are classified into pre-merger and 
post-merger. All of  the classifications are considered as independent observations. Merger 
and acquisition of  firms does not only affect the firm‘s management, but also greatly 
affects board compositions. Although firm‘s title might not change after the merger, the 
acquirer undergoes substantial changes in both management and organizational structure. 
It would therefore be logical to treat pre and post merger observations as two separate 
fields. 
For instance, the observations of  Kookmin Bank are divided into pre-merger and 
post-merger Kookmin Bank observations and post-merger observations. Observation 
data of  Housing Bank, which was acquired by Kookmin Bank, is gathered until when the 
merger took place in the 2000. For the banks that went out of  business during the 
proposed time frame—such as Daedong Bank and Dongnam Bank—data was gathered 
until the point of  closure. 
 
Variable definitions and measurements 
Dependent variables 
Two dependent variables were selected in measuring bank performances. Return on 
assets (ROA) was selected as the first variable to measure a general firm performance. To 
capture distinctive performance characteristic of  banks, net interest margin (NIM) was 
selected as the second dependent variable. NIM is the most fundamental source of  
operating income directly related to the bank‘s profitability and management capability. 
For these reasons, NIM has already been used as a measure which is unique for banks in a 
number of  prior studies (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Claessens et al., 2001; Unite 
and Sullivan, 2003). NIM is calculated as the net interest revenue divided by the total 
assets.  
 
Independent variables 
Independent variables in this study were the numbers of  personnel in the board 
composition who has network ties to either the government or foreign companies, or who 
is an accounting specialist. Board of  directors for a bank can be limited to directors 
appointed in the general stockholders‘ meeting.  
Nevertheless, the executives not officially included in the board too have quite 
powerful positions in the actual management of  Korean banks. The board approval rate 
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of  management plans presented by non-listed executives—without any amendments to 
the original plan—reaches as high as 96.3% (for Korean banks in 2004). Therefore, the 
concept of  board of  directors is extended in this study to include the CEO, the actual 
directors of  the boards, and other executives (non-listed) as the subjects of  this study 
(Chagannti and Sambharya, 1987). Personnel with government network ties were defined 
as executives with an experience in the Congress, Prosecutor‘s Office, Ministry of  Finance 
and Economics, Financial Supervisory Service, or the Bank of  Korea. Personnel with 
network ties to foreign companies were defined as the executives with foreign nationality 
or with an experience in the foreign financial institutions. This is in line with Usdiken‘s 
(1992) study, which included the vice president of  a bank in the definition of  the bank‘s 
top management team. 
The accounting specialists, also included in the broad definition of  board of  directors, 
were defined as executives who are also CPAs or professors in accounting-related 
departments. The career paths of  selected executives were verified using data from KIS-
LINE, which is database provided by Korea Investors Service. It offers reliable corporate 
data on more than 1.2 million companies. Data sources for the database include Financial 
Supervisory Service, The Bank of  Korea, and various press releases. 
  
Control variables 
Following Hillman‘s (2005) research, firm size and board size were controlled for in 
order to correctly identify the relationship between bank performance and board 
composition. Firm size was defined using the amount of  asset a bank possessed. We 
observed a significant positive skewedness, and therefore took logarithm (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 1996). We have further controlled for size of  board of  directors since the effects of  
independent variables can change according to the size of  board. Prior performance is 
controlled for performance (t – 1), using the instrumental variable technique to avoid 
specification problems. Controlling for prior performance effectively accounted for other 
factors which could affect performance apart from board composition (Johnston & 
DiNardo, 1997). Finally, outside director size were controlled because the size of  outside 
directors have influenced to firm performance (Hillman, 2005).  
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Data description and methodological procedures 
A panel data of  financial institutions in the Korean financial sector within the 10 year 
time frame since 1997 was collected for this study. The panel data, in comparison to the 
cross-sectional or time-series data, can capture changes happening both cross-sectional 
and longitudinal-wise. Also, the panel data can help in measuring the effects of  diverse 
independent variables on dependent variables, both observable and unobservable. The 
estimations can be more effective as the degree of  freedom increases with the use of  
panel data, for panel data is in a form that integrates both cross-sectional and longitudinal 
data. The probability of  multicollinearity also decreases with the use of  a panel data. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of  the variables used in this study. The average 
number of  government-related personnel in the sample was 1.8. Average number of  
accounting specialists was 0.23 and 2.57 individuals were foreign-related personnel. Net 
interest margin which represents actual profitability of  a bank, showed an average of  -3.87 
and ROA showed an average of  -0.64. Average size of  a board of  directors was close to 
17, while the average number of  outside directors was 5.9 and the largest number of  
personnel a board contained was 36 directors. The asset size, controlled for as firm size 
variable, showed an average of  approximately 39 trillion KRW. Figure1 depicts the 
changes in board composition during the period between 1997 and 2006. 
In this study, two analyses has been carried out to highlight the effects of  board 
composition changes made in order to adapt to environmental shift on performance of  
financial firms. First analysis looked at 10 year period containing the Korean economic 
crisis—from 1997 to 2006—for relationship between board composition of  a bank and its 
performance.  
For analyzing a panel data of  this study, we used ‗xtgls‘ in STATA 11 to estimate 
coefficients based on feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). FGLS is frequently used 
to remedy possible problems of  panel heteroschedasticity, contemporaneous correlation 
and serial correlation (Hitt, Gimeno, and Hoskisson, 1998), since these can violate the 
traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) assumptions of  constant variance and no 
autocorrelation of  the error term. FGLS produces residuals which are used to estimate 
the unit-specific serial correction of  the errors and then used to transform the model into 
one with serially independent errors. In this way, errors without contemporaneous 
correlation and autocorrelation allow for OLS estimation.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Min Max Mean SD 
ROA -11.06 3.06 -.64 2.51 
NIM -92.58 29.63 -3.87 21.62 
ROA(t-1) -9.92 3.06 -.5793 2.33 
NIM(t-1) -1850.71 44.94 -28.2152 165.61 
Firm size  1.20 218.86 38.58     40.39 
Board size 4 36 17.25 7.83 
Outside Director .00 36.00 5.85 5.1 
Government related personnel  .00 6.00 1.76 2.95 
Accounting specialist .00 4.00 0.23 0.58 
Foreign company related personnel .00 30.00 2.57 5.77 
Note: The unit of firm size is trillion KRW. The unit of board size, outside director, government related personnel, 
accounting specialist, foreign company related personnel is number of person. 
 
Figure 1: Change in specialists during the 10 year period 
 
Second analysis was carried out for clear comparison between period during Korean 
economic crisis and post-economic crisis. Each period was separated analyzed. Using 2001, 
when Korean government fully redeemed the bailout funds to IMF, as the anchor year, 
1997 through 2001 were defined as the period of  economic crisis and 2002 through 2006 
was defined as post-economic crisis period.  
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Prior to verifying proposed hypotheses, correlations for all variables included in this 
study are shown in table 3. A VIF test was carried out because correlation measures of  
variables indicated that some variables might be correlated. However, VIF test results were 
between 1.04 and 1.08, ruling out the possibility of  a multicollinearity between variables. 
First we provided the output of  during economic crisis in table 4. It shows that the 
number of  government related personnel in the board composition has a significant 
positive effect on both ROA and NIM. It means that Korean financial institutions recruit 
a significant number of  personnel with relationships with the Korean government, and 
this appeared to have strong effects on firm performance. And foreign company related 
personnel is also significantly and positively affect on firm performance.   
 
Table 3: Correlations for all variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.ROA 1          
2.NIM .983** 1         
3.ROA(t-1) .432** .463** 1        
4.NIM(t-1) .151 .172* .626** 1       
5.Firm size(log) -.028 -.049 .007 -.068 1      
6.BOD size .150* .135 .154 .095 .118 1     
7. Outside Director .171* .159* .134 .043 .050 .419** 1    
8. Government related personnel .201** .221** .197* .130 -.025 .062 .049 1   
9. Accounting specialist .020 .012 .020 .043 -.052 .182* .210** .004 1  
10.Foreign company related personnel .172* .154* .140 .080 .123 .491** .723** .006 .114 1 
 
Table 4: FGLS result during 1997~2006 (n=139) 
Variable ROA NIM 
Constant -0.45 -6.17 
ROA(t-1) 0.40***  
NIM (t-1)  0.13 
Firm size (log) -0.08 -1.07 
Board size 0.01 0.15 
Outside director  0.01 0.04 
Government related personnel 3.98** 53.8*** 
Accounting specialist  1.52 -6.90 
Foreign company related personnel 1.03 15.2* 
Wald Chi squire 50.4*** 19.9** 
* Significant at 0.1, ** Significant at 0.05, *** Significant at 0.001 
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Secondly, we offer the output of  separated dataset during economic crisis and post-
economic crisis period in order to compare the differences. Table 5 shows the effect of  
board composition on performance during the economic crisis period of  1997 through 
2001, using ROA as dependent variable, shows that government-related personnel and 
accounting specialists has positive effect on performance (p < 0.01). In model using NIM 
as dependent variable government-related personnel, accounting specialists, and foreign-
related personnel all has positive effect on performance.  
 
Table 5: FGLS result during 1997~2001 (n=68) 
Variable ROA NIM 
Constant -2.61** -23.6* 
ROA(t-1) 0.20  
NIM (t-1)  -0.01* 
Firm size (log) 0.09 1.17 
Outside director 0.23 0.09 
BOD size 0.01 0.09 
Government related personnel 0.33*** 2.66** 
Accounting specialist 0.92*** 9.09*** 
Foreign company related personnel 0.40* 1.16* 
Wald Chi squire 67.6*** 35.3** 
* Significant at 0.1, ** Significant at 0.05, *** Significant at 0.001 
 
Table 6: FGLS result during 2002~2006 (n=70) 
Variable ROA NIM 
Constant -1.18*** 20.6*** 
ROA(t-1) 0.20  
NIM (t-1)  0.90** 
Firm size (log) -1.03*** -0.09 
Outside director -0.04 -0.66** 
BOD size 0.01  
Government related personnel -0.01 2.59 
Accounting specialist 0.98 1.23 
Foreign company related personnel -0.02 -0.09 
Wald Chi squire 44.37*** 61.49** 
* Significant at 0.1, ** Significant at 0.05, *** Significant at 0.001  
 
Table 6 shows the effect of  board composition on performance during post-
economic crisis period between 2002 and 2006. None of  the three variables of  
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government-related personnel, accounting specialists, and foreign-related personnel show 
significant effects on ROA and NIM. Moreover, government-related personnel and 
foreign-related personnel showed negative effects on performance—although the results 
were insignificant.  
Comparison of  economic crisis period and post-crisis period confirmed our 
hypothesis that board composition changes related to environmental shifts acts as a 
resource for focal firm and positively effects performance. Thus, hypothesis 1, 2, and 3 are 
all supported.  
Another out of  the ordinary result is that the effect of  outside directors on the board 
had negative associations with firm performance. And the reason for such a negative 
association could have been due to regulation reinforcements forcing introduction of  
outside directors in the board or the failure to adequately assess capabilities of  outside 
directors prior to employment.  
In this result, we can recognize that external environmental shift should be taken into 
account when studying effect of  BOD composition on firm‘s performance, and 
environmental linkages can change according to environmental shifts.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
This study looked into the process of  a firm actively adapting to the environmental 
shift and generating good performances by acquiring relational capital as well as personal 
expertise through the board members. The sample of  analysis was the Korean banking 
industry during the 10 year period from 1997 to 2006. The effect of  board composition 
on firm‘s performance was measured, specifically focusing on personnel with political 
background, accounting specialists, and foreign company related personnel. Especially 
results from analyses on separately categorized samples has shown that in the onset of  
intense environmental shifts, such as government led restructuring, strengthening of  
supervisory standards, improvements on accounting transparency, and rapidly pushed 
globalization, specific factors in BOD (board of  director) composition had positive effect 
on firm performance; government related personnel, accounting specialists, and personnel 
with experience in foreign firms acted as linkages with external environment. In the post-
economic crisis period, however, such personnel no longer had significant impact on the 
performance. It means if  the environment changes, the BOD composition should be also 
adjusted.    
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These results from this study have several implications. First of  all, our study shows 
that the context 
such as external environmental shift should be taken into account when studying 
effect of  BOD composition on firm‘s performance. It also shows the need for further 
empirical study on effects of  BOD composition in various sets of  environmental shifts.  
Secondly, external environmental shift should be considered as an important factor 
when they are trying to organize a board of  directors, for it could have substantial effect 
on firm‘s performance. Board members who could act as a resource increases in their 
importance when uncertainty in the external environment is high. And environmental 
linkages can change according to environmental shifts.  
Third of  all is that the negative association between outside director and firm 
performance portrayed by the results presents a meaningful implication for the real 
business world. And the reason for such a negative association could have been due to 
regulation reinforcements forcing introduction of  outside directors in the board or the 
failure to adequately assess capabilities of  outside directors prior to employment. 
Additionally, the inappropriate power distributions to outside directors and the readily 
found over-submissive attitude of  the majority of  outside directors to the management‘s 
decisions in the Korean financial industry also seem to be closely related to the negative 
relationship. This suggests researches on usefulness of  outside directors needs to be 
carried out in emerging countries, including Korea.  
This study, however, is limited to the Korean financial industry, focusing specifically 
on the banks. More researches on other country and other industry sectors would be 
necessary in order to generalize the findings of  this study. Additionally, future studies 
should also look into how environmental linkages change according to different types of  
environmental shifts in various institutional contexts—especially through studying the 
changes in board composition. 
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